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Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital 
Markets: Empirical Evidence from China 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study provides empirical evidence of managerial agency costs in socialistic 
internal capital markets. Listed Chinese companies are required to disclose the 
amount of resources that are reallocated to other firms of the parent company, which 
provides us with a direct measure of the socialistic subsidization of weak member 
firms by strong member firms within a business group. We hypothesize that in strong 
member firms, managerial compensation is less sensitive to firm performance because 
cross-subsidization makes it difficult for group CEOs to hold the managers in strong 
firms accountable for their own firms’ performance, and also increases the noise in 
performance measures. We also hypothesize that socialistic cross-subsidization results 
in an increase in managerial agency costs of strong member firms due to the low pay-
performance sensitivity and low incentive to work hard. We document empirical 
results that are consistent with these two predictions. 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G15, G32, G34 
 
Keywords: Managerial agency costs, Managerial compensation, Conglomerate, 
Business group, Socialistic internal capital markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital 
Markets: Empirical Evidence from China 
 
The presence of large conglomerates or business groups is a dominant feature of 
both developed and developing countries. This business form is known to have both 
benefits and costs (see Stein, 2003 for a literature review). A key benefit is that the 
existence of an internal capital market within a business group allows the 
economically significant reallocation of resources across member firms and avoids the 
constraints that are imposed by imperfect external capital markets (see, for example, 
Williamson, 1975; Stein, 1997; Deloof, 1998; Dewaelheyns and Hulle, 2006).1 
However, the downside is that a group’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) may 
reallocate resources from member firms with good investment opportunities (strong 
firms) to cross-subsidize members with poor investment opportunities (weak firms), a 
phenomenon that Scharfstein and Stein (2000) calls “socialism.” 
The socialistic internal capital market is believed to be inefficient because a well-
functioning internal capital market or non-socialistic internal capital market should 
channel scarce capital resources into their most productive use. It means that non-
socialistic internal market capital should reallocate more resources to member firms 
with better investment opportunities. Then why socialism exists in internal capital 
markets? Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that managers of weak member firms 
with poor investment opportunities have stronger incentives to spend time lobbying to 
have more capital allocations. When there is a preference of group CEOs to 
compensate these managers with capital allocations rather than with higher salaries, 
this behavior leads to larger than efficient allocations or inefficient capital allocations 
                                                 
1 Like Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006), we use the terms “conglomerate” and “business group” 
interchangeably, because both have internal capital markets in which capital is allocated among 
member firms (in the case of business groups) and among divisions (in the case of conglomerates). 
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to weaker member firms. The inefficiency of the socialism also arises from the agency 
costs in strong member firms with good investment opportunities because their 
managers are not happy with the cross-subsidization of weak member firms. This 
paper provides empirical evidence of managerial agency costs in strong member firms 
that arise in socialistic internal capital markets using a unique dataset of listed 
companies in China. 
The socialism of internal capital reallocation causes agency problems for the 
managers of stronger member firms for two reasons. Brusco and Panunzi (2005) 
argue that the potential threat of resources being taken away from strong member 
firms and passed to weak member firms can diminish the incentive of the managers of 
strong member firms ex ante. As managers of strong member firms have to share the 
firm’s surplus with weaker members while internalizing all of the disutility of their 
efforts, they may choose to work less (Brusco and Panunzi, 2005) or to invest 
inefficiently to protect their surplus (Rajan et al., 2000). A mechanism to ameliorate 
the agency problems in strong member firms is to set managerial compensation based 
on firm’s surplus. However, the presence of socialistic capital allocation makes it 
difficult for group CEOs to hold the managers in strong member firms accountable for 
their own firms’ performance, and also increases the noise in performance measures, 
which thus negatively affects pay-performance sensitivity in strong member firms. 
Accordingly, managerial effort will still be lower in strong member firms.  
There are two features that make the Chinese setting distinct. The first is that the 
socialistic cross-subsidization in Chinese group companies is more pronounced 
because there is a greater diversity of investment opportunities between strong and 
weak member firms. Most of China’s newly listed firms are restructured state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (Aharony et al. 2010) and they have unlisted controlling corporate 
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shareholders or parent companies (Sun and Tong, 2003) with which they form a 
business group. However, going public is restricted by the Chinese government, and 
priority is given to firms with better investment opportunities. Hence, during the 
process of restructuring, SOEs spin off the more profitable units and keep the less 
profitable units as part of the parent company (Aharony et al., 2010).2 This unique 
restructuring process creates a huge tension between the parent company and its listed 
affiliates, because the CEO of the parent company has a strong incentive to reallocate 
resources from profitable listed member firms to unprofitable unlisted parent units 
(Yao et al., 2010). As Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan et al. (2000) argue that 
socialistic cross-subsidization should be more pronounced when there is a greater 
diversity of investment opportunities within a business group, the internal capital 
markets of China’s group companies should be featured with more socialism than 
their counterparts in other countries. 
Another distinct feature of the Chinese setting is that we can directly observe the 
magnitude of resource reallocation from strong to weak member firms. Listed 
companies are required to disclose information on related party transactions with their 
parent company, and must specifically disclose the receivables from their affiliated 
parent company in the financial footnotes to their annual reports (Aharony et al., 
2010).3 These receivables represent the amount of resources that are reallocated from 
                                                 
2 We hand collect the financial information of parent companies from the prospectuses provided by 
listed companies when they went public. We also search the internet for parent companies’ financial 
performance when the information is not available in the prospectuses. We obtain the financial 
performance of the parent companies for 195 listed companies in the IPO year. More than 83% of the 
listed firms are more profitable than their parent companies. The mean (median) of ROE for listed 
firms is 20.8% (18.8%), while the mean (median) of ROE for their parent firms is merely 10.3% 
(7.1%). The difference in ROA also exhibits similar pattern. Both the parametric and non-parametric 
statistical tests indicate that the 195 listed companies are significantly more profitable than their parent 
companies. These findings further corroborate our argument that, during the process of IPO, Chinese 
companies spin off the more profitable units and keep the less profitable units as part of the parent 
company. 
3 In 1997, China Ministry of Finance released “Accounting Standards for Enterprises - Disclosure of 
Related Parties and Transactions”, effective for reporting periods beginning January 1, 1997. The 
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the listed company to other member firms of the parent company. There are two types 
of reallocated resources: operational and non-operational resources. Operational 
reallocated resources derive from operating activities, such as sales of goods and 
services to the parent company, and are represented by the amount of accounts 
receivable from the parent company. Non-operational resources derive from non-
operating activities and are represented by the amount of other receivables. We argue 
that operational accounts receivable cannot be termed socialistic resource reallocation 
because they are part of normal operating activities, and thus the magnitude of 
reallocated resources is indicated by the amount of non-operational other receivables 
from the parent company as disclosed in the annual reports of listed member firms.4 
Socialistic resource reallocation or cross-subsidization through non-operating 
activities can take many forms such as one-off sales of assets, loan guarantees, 
corporate loans and transfer pricing. Exhibit 1 of Aharony et al. (2010, page 5) 
presents a more complete list of means which may relocate resources from listed 
companies to unlisted parent companies in China. Among all the means of cross-
subsidization, both Aharony et al. (2010) and Jiang et al. (2010) show that corporate 
loans (a major type of other receivables) is the most popular means of resources 
reallocation in China’s listed firms. A report by New Fortune magazine investigates 
58 firms sanctioned by the China Securities Regulatory Commission for the diversion 
of resources out of the listed firms by parent companies from 2005 to 2006 (Sheng, 
2006). The report finds that 48 of these cases are related to inter-corporate loans. Thus 
both academic research and anecdotal evidence suggest that corporate loans is the 
most pervasive means of cross-subsidization in China’s listed firms. We acknowledge 
                                                                                                                                            
China Securities Regulatory Commission required all listed firms to comply with the standard and 
disclose details about related party transactions since 1997. 
4 As a robustness check, we also use operational accounts receivable as a proxy for resource 
reallocation in our analysis but we do not find any impact on managerial pay-performance sensitivity. 
The results are presented in Table 4. 
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that transfer pricing may be another direct means of cross-subsidization but there is no 
disclosure of transfer prices. Hence we employ the amount of other receivables to 
measure the cross-subsidization.5 In summary, the two distinctive features of the 
Chinese setting give us not only a direct measure of resource reallocation within a 
group, but allow us to investigate socialistic internal capital markets. 
Using a sample of 1,395 Chinese firms that listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period of 2004 to 2008, we find empirical 
results that are consistent with the predictions. Specifically, we find that a higher level 
of resource reallocation from listed company to parent company is associated with 
lower managerial pay-performance sensitivity in the listed companies. We also show 
that the amount of resource reallocation is positively associated with managerial 
agency costs in the listed companies. Following Ang et al. (2000), we measure agency 
costs using two alternative efficiency ratios: the expense ratio, which is operating 
expenses scaled by annual sales, and the asset utilization ratio, which is annual sales 
divided by total assets. In addition, we use cash payments for traveling and 
entertainment as a proxy for the perks that are enjoyed by managers.6 For all three 
measures, we find the level of managerial agency costs to be positively associated 
with the magnitude of resource reallocation. Economically, operating expenses will 
increase by 0.242 dollars for every dollar of financial resources that is reallocated 
from a listed company to a parent company.  
                                                 
5 Cross-subsidization may also happen in overseas listed Chinese firms. CNOOC Limited, dual-listed 
in New York and Hong Kong in February 2001, is China's largest producer of offshore crude oil and 
natural gas. According to its annuals reports between 2002 and 2005, CNOOC lent or deposited as 
much as RMB 6.6 billion to its sister company CNOOC Finance without approval from minority 
shareholders. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong censured CNOOC Limited for breaching its listing 
rules in 2005 (http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20051006/LTN20051006085.pdf). 
6 We obtain these data from a cash flow statement item called “Cash payment for other operating-
related activities,” which mainly includes cash payments for traveling, entertainment, rent, insurance, 
and fines. 
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Our paper provides a direct measure of socialistic cross-subsidization from strong 
to weak member firms. Empirical studies, such that of as Rajan et al. (2000), can only 
roughly define socialistic cross-subsidization as the industry-adjusted investment of 
low-q divisions minus the industry-adjusted investment of high-q divisions. Other 
studies, such as those of Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998), use the sensitivity 
of a division’s investment to the cash flow of other divisions to infer the possible 
existence of cross-subsidization within a diversified conglomerate. We are able to 
directly observe the magnitude of socialistic cross-subsidization because all of the 
receivables from parent companies are disclosed in the annual reports of the listed 
companies. 
Our paper also provides direct empirical evidence of managerial agency costs in 
socialistic internal capital markets. Existing studies, such as those of Rajan et al. 
(2000) and Shin and Stulz (1998), link socialistic internal capital markets with a 
diversification discount, and ascribe the poor performance of diversified firms 
(diversification discount) to inefficient (socialistic) resource reallocation.7 In contrast, 
we examine the costs of socialism from the perspective of the agency conflicts 
between group CEOs and managers in strong member firms, and posit that cross-
subsidization reduces the incentive of managers and hence increases the managerial 
agency costs in strong member firms. 
The incentives to allocate resources from listed companies to unlisted parent 
companies could be that shareholders of parent companies intend to expropriate 
minority shareholders of listed companies (the expropriation incentive) or parent 
CEOs intend to cross-subsidize weak member firms (the socialism incentive). 
Although the two incentives are non-exclusive, they ascribe the poor performance 
                                                 
7 As mentioned by Stein (2003), this linkage has been challenged on methodological grounds because 
of the endogeneity of the diversification decision. 
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associated with internal capital transfer to two different agency problems. As 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) point out, there are two types of agency problems: the 
classic owner-manager conflicts (type I agency problem or the managerial agency 
problem in our paper) and the conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (type II agency problem). The expropriation argument primarily focuses 
on the type II agency problem of internal capital market. For instance, Aharony et al. 
(2010) and Jiang et al. (2010) show that Chinese parent companies expropriate their 
listed subsidiaries’ minority shareholders by reallocating funds from listed companies 
to parent companies, which implies that the poor performance in listed subsidiaries 
can be attributed to the type II agency problem (the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by the controlling shareholders). Other studies such as Bertrand et al. 
(2002) and Joh (2003) also primarily ascribe poor performance associated with 
internal capital markets to type II agency costs. Our study instead suggests that the 
poor performance may arise from the type I agency costs, i.e., the conflicts between 
shareholders and managers or managerial agency costs in this paper (the socialism 
incentive). Unlike the expropriation argument that ignores the adverse impacts of 
tunneling on managerial incentives, the socialism argument sheds light on the impact 
of internal capital transfer on managerial agency costs (Brusco and Panunzi, 2005; 
Inderst and Laux, 2005; Rajan et al., 2000). 
Our paper complements the existing literature to empirically show that socialistic 
internal capital markets create not only type II agency problem but also the classic 
type I agency problem. Specifically, we find that socialistic internal capital markets 
result in higher operating expenses and managerial perks, and lower asset utilization 
efficiency, from which both controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
suffer. The reason for controlling shareholders to engage in cross-subsidization is 
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because the net benefits from cross-subsidization for the controlling shareholders are 
very likely to be positive as the resources transferred to the controlling shareholders 
generally exceed the controlling shareholders’ losses from the type I agency issues. 
For instance, we document that operating expenses will increase by 0.242 dollar for 
every dollar of cross-subsidization. As the average ownership by controlling 
shareholders is 37%, this suggests that controlling shareholders will lose merely 0.09 
dollar (0.242*37%=0.09) due to cross-subsidization, which is far less than the benefit 
(one dollar) from cross-subsidization for the controlling shareholders. However, 
minority shareholders will suffer from both the type I and type II agency costs. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we review the 
literature on socialistic internal capital markets and develop our hypotheses. In 
Section II, we present the research design that is used to test the hypotheses, which is 
followed in Section III by descriptions of the sample and data. We then present the 
empirical results in Section IV and give a summary and conclusions in Section V. 
 
I. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
In this section, we briefly review the literature on socialistic internal capital 
markets, and develop two hypotheses. 
 
A. Literature on Socialistic Internal Capital Markets 
The central question of an internal capital market is whether a business group’s 
CEO can efficiently reallocate resources across the member firms in the group. The 
advantage of internal capital markets lies in the “smarter-money” and “winner-
picking” effects which are well documented in the literature (see, for example, 
Alchian, 1969; Stein, 1997; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002). The main idea is that group 
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CEOs will use their high-quality information as a basis for making value-enhancing 
resource reallocations across member firms.8 
The downside of internal capital markets is the decreasing of value by division 
managers who may sway their CEOs to reallocate resources inefficiently. In 
theoretical models by Milgrom (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1988), and Meyer et al. 
(1992), division managers are portrayed as rent-seeking agents who try to actively 
persuade their CEOs to give them more resources. However, these models fail to take 
into account that such rent-seeking behavior may be recognized by CEOs, and also 
fail to demonstrate that such resource reallocation is necessarily inefficient. 
Rajan et al. (2000) extend the literature by assuming that the group CEO acts on 
behalf of the shareholders. They argue that the principal CEO is likely to believe that 
a more equal capital budget increases the incentive of division managers to engage in 
cooperative, joint-surplus-maximizing behavior, as opposed to self-interested, rent-
seeking behavior. They thus predict that when the diversity of resources and 
opportunities among divisions increases, resources will flow toward the most 
inefficient division, which leads to more inefficient investment and a reduction in firm 
value. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) relax the principal CEO assumption and assume 
the CEO to be an agent that may direct resources to weaker divisions to retain 
division managers, thus saving the firm’s cash for other, more privately attractive 
purposes. These two studies introduce a theoretical socialistic internal capital market 
within a conglomerate or business group in which weak divisions are subsidized by 
stronger divisions. Their predictions are also supported by empirical evidence (e.g., 
Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein, 1998).  
                                                 
8 There may be external costs even when conglomerates have efficient internal capital markets. 
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) argue that because of the financial market imperfections that are 
engendered by imperfect investor protection, conglomerates that engage in winner-picking find it 
optimal to allocate scarce capital internally to mediocre projects, even when other firms in the economy 
have more productive projects that are in need of additional capital. 
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Whether there exists efficiency of internal capital market in China’s group 
companies is still under debate. Prior literature suggests that the “smarter-money” and 
“winner-picking” effects do not exist in Chinese companies (Yang et al., 2010; Shao 
and Liu, 2009). However, Zheng et al. (2007) show that the internal capital market is 
more efficient when the level of internal transactions is low. Literature on the 
inefficiency of internal capital market centers on the expropriation incentive, i.e., the 
controlling shareholders tend to use internal capital markets to exploit minority 
shareholders and reallocate capital from stronger member firms (the listed firms) to 
weaker member firms (the parent firms) (Aharony, et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 2010). To 
the best of our knowledge, there is no study to examine the impact of socialistic 
internal capital market on managerial agency costs in China’s group companies. 
 
B. Managerial Agency Costs in Socialistic Internal Capital Markets 
Socialistic cross-subsidization may weaken the incentive of the managers of 
strong member firms to work hard, thus creating managerial agency problems. For 
example, Brusco and Panunzi (2005) and Inderst and Laux (2005) argue that if 
managers of strong member firms cannot be certain that they will be able to reinvest 
all of the profits that are generated by their firm, they will not want to work as hard to 
create these profits in the first place. They may also adopt a defensive investment that, 
although inefficient, will better protect the firm’s surplus (Rajan et al., 2000). 
A mechanism to ameliorate the agency problems in strong member firms is to set 
managerial compensation based on the firm’s surplus. However, prior literature 
suggests that, in the presence of agency and information problems, optimal incentive 
schemes are less powerful, and thus managerial effort will still be lower in the strong 
member firms (Bernardo et al., 2006). The reason for this is that the information rents 
 11 
that are paid to managers increase with project quality, which implies that the 
marginal cost of providing incentive schemes is higher in strong member firms 
because they have higher average project quality. In this case, Bernardo et al. (2006) 
theoretically show that the managers of the strong divisions of group firms receive 
lower-powered incentives compared to the managers of the weak divisions of group 
firms or independent firms (see their discussions on page 496 and Corollary 4 on page 
497).9 
Furthermore, Bertrand et al. (2002), Aharony et al. (2010) and Jiang et al. (2010) 
document that the parent companies use inter-corporate loans (the socialistic capital 
allocation in our paper) to extract funds from listed firms, which is detrimental to the 
interests of listed firms’ minority shareholders. Such rent-seeking activities will 
negatively affect managerial pay-performance sensitivity in three ways. First, Fan and 
Wong (2002), Chen and Chu (2005), and Desai and Dharmapala (2009) suggest that 
in order to facilitate such rent-seeking activities, the insiders need to create vague 
information to mislead the outsiders. Chen and Chu (2005) contend that such 
vagueness will reduce the informational value of financial performance in managerial 
compensation contracting. As managerial incentive schemes rely on quality 
performance information (Bushman and Smith, 2001), deterioration in the quality of 
such information then reduces pay-performance sensitivity.  
Second, it is usually difficult to infer the shadow price of capital in the absence of 
a well-developed external financial market. Managers in strong member firms may 
ascribe their poor performance to the cross-subsidization of capital. The cross-
subsidization then makes group CEOs more difficult to distinguish the managerial 
                                                 
9 Another mechanism is to base the compensation of the managers of member firms more on overall 
group performance (Bushman et al., 1995). However, Palia (1999) finds that the compensation of a 
member firm manager is less likely to be linked to overall group performance when socialistic cross-
subsidization is severe. 
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shirking effect from the socialistic cross-subsidization effect when a firm’s 
performance is poor. If group CEOs cannot perfectly filter out the impact of capital 
transfer on the profitability of strong member firms, then the noise of the performance 
measures in strong member firms will increase. This also implies that it is hard to 
write member firm managers’ compensation based on their own firms’ performance. 
Third, to encourage listed firms’ managers to optimize the performance of 
business groups rather than that of the listed firms and to facilitate the capital 
reallocation from listed firms to parent units, the controlling shareholders may tend to 
place a lower weight on listed firms’ performance when designing the incentive 
contracts for listed firms’ managers (Bushman et al., 1995). 
Overall, the presence of socialistic capital allocation increases the noise of the 
performance measures in listed firms, makes managers less accountable for firm 
performance, places a lower weight on listed firms’ performance when designing the 
incentive contracts and hence leads to lower pay-performance sensitivity.10 This leads 
to the first hypothesis, which is stated in an alternative format as follows. 
 
H1: The managerial pay-performance sensitivity in strong member firms 
(listed firms) is negatively associated with the amount of subsidization from 
strong to weak member firms (parent firms). 
 
                                                 
10 We acknowledge that political promotion may provide additional incentive for managers in China. 
However, Cao et al. (2010) find that merely 8.6% of managers (272 out of 3160 observations) are 
politically promoted in Chinese listed firms during the period of 2002-2007. This suggests that 
monetary compensation still plays a significant role in managerial incentives for a majority of Chinese 
listed firms. Furthermore, political promotion-based incentive is typically applied to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and managers with political connection (Cao et al., 2010). We have controlled for 
SOEs and political connected managers in our empirical tests. Table 4 in our paper suggests that 
political connection reduces pay-performance sensitivity, which is consistent with Cao et al. (2010). 
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As we discussed in the literature review, managers in strong member firms have 
less incentives to work hard ex ante due to the socialistic cross-subsidization. The 
lower managerial pay-performance sensitivity further exacerbates the managerial 
agency problems in strong member firms.11 This leads to the second hypothesis, 
which is stated in an alternative format as follows.12 
 
H2: Managerial agency costs in strong member firms (listed firms) are 
positively associated with the amount of resources that are reallocated from 
strong to weak member firms (parent firms). 
 
II. Research Design 
In this section, we describe the research methodologies that are designed to test 
these two hypotheses. 
 
A. Socialistic Internal Capital Market and Managerial Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
We employ the following model to investigate the impact of socialistic internal 
capital markets on managerial pay-performance sensitivity in listed companies: 
 
                                                 
11 Market for corporate control may play roles in monitoring managers of listed companies and hence 
reduce managerial agency costs. However, we believe managers of China’s listed firms face less 
pressure from market for corporate control than their counterparts in the west. Unlike in the U.S. and 
the U.K., listed firms in China are characterized by concentrated ownership structure. For example, the 
average ownership held by the parent companies is 37% in our sample (see Table 2 for descriptive 
statistics). The concentrated ownership structure insulates the managers from the disciplinary pressure 
from the capital markets, as it is unlikely for external shareholders to purchase enough shares to replace 
the incumbent controlling shareholders and managers. Consequently, takeover activities are rare in 
China and very few managers are evicted from their current positions for poor performance by external 
shareholders or outside independent directors. 
12 We acknowledge that both hypotheses are expressed as association, rather than causality relation, 
which is a limitation of the study. 
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where ΔCEOPAYit is changes in CEO cash salaries and bonuses (in Chinese RMB) of 
listed firm i from year t-1 to year t. Managerial compensation in China is not so 
complicated as it is in the United States. Typically, a CEO’s pay is made up of a cash 
salary and a cash bonus. Very few firms have executive stock option schemes and 
anyway their disclosures are insufficient to allow us to reliably measure the value of 
stock options.13 We thus use a CEO’s total cash salaries and bonuses to measure CEO 
compensation in China (CEOPAY). 
We employ both accounting and stock performance measures to show the 
sensitivity between managerial compensation and firm performance. The accounting 
performance measure is changes in operating income of firm i from year t-1 to year t 
(ΔOIit); the stock performance measure is the stock return of firm i at year t minus the 
market return at year t (RETURNit). 
Our main independent variable is the measure of socialistic internal capital 
markets. Chinese companies are required to disclose receivables from related parties 
such as the parent company and its subsidiaries. There are two types of receivables: 
operational receivables that arise from sales of goods and services to the parent 
company (accounts receivable) and non-operating receivables (other receivables) that 
arise from non-operating activities such as loans to the parent company. Both 
represent the amount of resources that are reallocated from a listed company to the 
parent company. However, we believe that the reallocation of operational resources 
                                                 
13 Up until 2006, Chinese securities regulations precluded domestic listed firms to offer equity-based 
compensation to executives and directors. By the end of 2008, there are only 67 firms (less than 5% of 
our sample firms) issuing stock options. 
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cannot be termed socialistic reallocation because these resources are a part of normal 
operating activities. Thus, the magnitude of reallocated resources is measured by the 
net amount of other receivables from the parent company and its subsidiaries in a 
specific year (NORit).14 Specifically, NORit is calculated as firm i’s other receivables 
(OREC) from its parent company and the parent company’s subsidiaries in year t net 
of firm i’s other payables (OPAB) to its parent company and the parent company’s 
subsidiaries in year t if OREC is greater than OPAB, and zero otherwise, deflated by 
annual sales (excluding related party sales) in year t. Higher NOR indicates a larger 
magnitude of cross-subsidization from listed firms to parent firms.15 According to the 
first hypothesis, we expect a negative impact of NOR on the managerial pay-
performance sensitivity, that is, the estimation of 3E  and 4E  should be significantly 
negative. 
We include some control variables in the regression model. Fan et al. (2007) 
suggests that Chinese firms with politically connected CEOs have poor corporate 
governance. There may be a possible systematic difference in compensation packages 
between politically connected CEOs and non-politically connected CEOs. Politically 
connected CEOs may also have different incentives (such as promotion to a 
government position) from non-politically connected CEOs. Thus we include a 
politically connected CEO indicator (POLITIC) that equals one if the CEO serves as 
former or current government bureaucrat, that is, a current or former officer of the 
central or local governments or the military, and zero otherwise. ΔTAit is changes in 
book value of total assets (in thousands Chinese RMB) of firm i from year t-1 to year 
                                                 
14 Studies such as Aharony et al. (2010) and Jiang et al. (2010) show that Chinese parent companies 
use corporate loans (reported as other receivables) to siphon assets from a listed company. These 
findings also support our view that other receivables represent the socialistic resources allocation. 
15 In an early version of this study, we use OREC alone (not net of OPAB) to proxy for cross-
subsidization and obtain similar results. 
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t. We also control for time and industry effects by including year dummies and 
industry dummies in the regression model. 
 
B. Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets 
We employ the following model to examine how the presence of a socialistic 
internal capital market affects a firm’s managerial agency costs. 
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In Model (2), MACit is our measure of the managerial agency costs of firm i in year t 
and NORit is our measure of socialistic internal capital markets as defined in Model 
(1). Dk represents control variables, which we explain in detail as follows. We also 
control for time and industry effects by including year and industry dummies in the 
model. 
Managerial agency costs: We use three alternative measures of managerial 
agency costs. The first two are based on the study of Ang et al. (2000).16 The first 
measure is an expense ratio (OEXP), which is calculated as operating expenses 
(excluding managerial compensation and bad debt expense) divided by annual sales 
(excluding related party sales). This measure captures excessive expenses, including 
perk consumption. Higher other receivables (NOR) requires more allowance for bad 
debt expense, and hence increase operating expense (OEXP) mechanically. We thus 
exclude bad debt expense for calculation of operating expense. Our second measure 
of agency costs is calculated as the ratio of annual sales to total assets (excluding 
other receivables) multiplied by -1 to give an asset utilization efficiency ratio (AUR). 
This measure is a proxy for the loss in revenue that is attributable to inefficient asset 
                                                 
16 Unlike Ang et al. (2000), we do not have a zero agency cost benchmark to control, and thus our 
measures of agency costs may suffer from measurement error. 
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utilization as a result of poor investment decisions or shirking by the management. By 
multiplying the measure by -1, we align the direction of all three measures with 
agency costs, such that higher measures correspond to higher agency costs. Higher 
other receivables also increase book value of total assets, and hence increases asset 
utilization ratio (AUR) mechanically. We thus exclude other receivables from 
calculation of total assets. Our third measure of agency costs (CENT) is the amount of 
cash that is paid for traveling and entertainment as disclosed in the cash flow 
statement. Although this cash outflow is listed as expenditure on other activities that 
are related to operations, detailed disclosures tell us that most of it comprises payment 
for traveling and entertainment. We believe that this measure is a more direct means 
of capturing excessive consumption by managers. In order to examine the validity of 
CENT, we also hand collect the perquisite information which is disclosed under 
selling, general and administrative (SGA) expenses in company’s financial statement 
notes, and use the sum of traveling, entertainment, overseas training and corporate 
limousine expenses (PERK) as our measure of managerial perks. Note, however, 
approximately only 30% of our sample firms disclose the breakdown of SGA 
expenses and hence we only have 1,440 observations for PERK. We find that CENT is 
highly correlated with PERK (Pearson correlation=0.534, p<0.001), indicating that 
CENT is a good proxy for perks. In the robustness analyses, we also use PERK as a 
proxy of agency costs, and our results remain qualitatively the same. 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) find that when shareholder protection is weak, there 
are more severe managerial agency problem when managers hold more cash. We thus 
introduce the beginning-of-period cash holdings (CASH), deflated by sales (excluding 
related party sales), to control for the potential impact of cash holdings on managerial 
agency costs. Similar to Ang et al. (2000), we also introduce managerial ownership 
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measured as percentage of shares held by managers (MOWN), parent firm ownership 
measured as percentage of shares held by parent company (POWN), leverage 
measured as long-term liability divided by total assets (LEV), and firm size (lnTA) as 
control variables. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) argue that managerial compensation 
affects managerial efforts, and Eldenburg and Krishnan (2003) find that government-
owned organizations are less efficient. Thus, we also include CEO compensation 
(lnCEOPAY) and a state ownership indicator (STATE) as control variables. Finally, as 
corporate governance mechanisms affect managerial agency costs, we also include 
additional corporate governance variables, i.e., board independence (INDIRECT) 
measured as the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board, audit quality 
(AUDIT) measured as one if the auditor is an international Big-4 auditing firm and 
zero otherwise, and politically connected CEO (POLITIC) to complete Model (2). 
 
III. Sample and Data Description 
Our sample comprises all of the firms that are listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period 2004-2008. Before 
2004, few firms disclosed CEO compensation.17 We restrict our sample to firms that 
have listed for at least one year. Aharony et al. (2010) find that parent companies prop 
up affiliated listed companies during the initial public offering (IPO) process, which 
indicates that socialistic internal capital markets (resource reallocation from listed 
companies to affiliated parent companies) may not exist in the IPO process. We also 
exclude firms without related party transaction data disclosed in financial statement 
notes or other necessary data, and obtain 4,193 observations that represent 1,395 
                                                 
17 Chinese government started to require listed companies to disclose individual director and 
executive’s compensation in 2004. Before 2004, firms disclosed the compensation of their top three 
executives as an aggregated number. In an earlier version of this paper we used the aggregated 
compensation for top three executives to examine the same hypotheses during 2001 and 2003. We 
found qualitatively the same results as these presented in the current paper for the period 2004-2008. 
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unique firms. Related party transaction data, stock return data, and other accounting 
information are drawn from the China Securities Markets and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database. Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample selection process.18 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the sample composition by year. The sample 
observations are almost evenly distributed across years except for year 2004. Because 
managerial compensation data is missing for most firms in 2004, the number of 
observations for year 2004 is small (20 observations). Removing year 2004 
observations from our sample does not change the main results. Panel C reports the 
sample composition by industry. The machinery industry has the largest composition 
(682 observations and 16.27%), followed by the petrochemicals industry (469 and 
11.19%) and the minerals industry (389 and 9.28%).19  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of selected variables that are used in this 
study. We winsorize all of the continuous variables at 1% at each tail. The average 
amount of the net of other receivables and other payables due from and to the parent 
company and its subsidiaries (NOR) is about 2.12% of annual net sales.20 As the 
distribution of NOR is much skewed, we also run our regressions with the ranking of 
NOR in place of the actual values, and the results reported in this paper still hold. 
                                                 
18 The sample selection process reveals that there are 1,594 firm-year observations that do not disclose 
compensation and internal capital transfer information. We compare firms with and without 
compensation and internal capital transfer data. We find that firms disclosing such information are 
typically larger, have more independent directors on the board, have higher managerial ownership, and 
have lower controlling shareholder ownership. We use Heckman selection model to correct the 
potential sample selection bias and find that our main findings remain valid after correcting for the 
sample selection bias. 
19 We exclude all the observations in the machinery industry and get similar empirical results. Thus the 
high composition of machinery companies should have no impact on our main results.  
20 Deflation by total assets does not significantly change our main results. 
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In terms of the three measures of agency costs, on average, operating expenses 
(OEXP) and cash payments for traveling and entertainment (CENT) comprise about 
16.99% and 18.76% of annual net sales, respectively. The average asset utilization 
ratio (AUR) is about 71.75%, which indicates that one dollar in assets generates about 
0.72 dollars in sales. 
The ownership structure variables show that, on average, the shares that are held 
by the parent company (POWN) and the top executives (MOWN) are 37.0% and 
0.04%, respectively. These statistics are consistent with the fact in China listed 
companies are dominated by the largest shareholder (parent company), and the 
managers hold very little ownership (Sun and Tong, 2003). In addition, more than 
69% of our sample firms are controlled by the Chinese government (STATE). 
The corporate governance statistics show that about 35.4% of directors are 
independent directors, 5% of sample firms have Big-4 auditors, 9% of CEOs are 
politically connected, and the mean (median) CEO compensations (CEOPAY) is 
320,140 RMB (230,800 RMB). In terms of other firm characteristics, the average 
ROA is about 1.98%, the average stock return (RETURN) is 6.58%, the average firm 
size (TA) is 4,814 million RMB, and the average long-term leverage ratio (LEV) is 
5.67%.21  
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for our main 
regression variables. The amount of cross-subsidization (NOR) is negatively 
associated with managerial compensation (the Pearson coefficient is -0.153 at a 
                                                 
21 We also adopt the ratio of total liabilities to total assets as the proxy for leverage, and obtain 
qualitatively the same regression results. 
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significance level of 1%) and positively associated with all three measures of 
managerial agency costs. The three measures of agency costs are also highly 
positively correlated. We do find significant correlation among the other control 
variables: for example, the Pearson correlation coefficient between firm size and CEO 
compensations is 0.404 at a significance level of 1%. The variance inflation factors of 
all of the independent variables indicate there is no serious multi-collinearity problem 
in our regressions. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
A. Socialistic Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Pay-Performance Sensitivity  
We employ the pay-performance sensitivity Model (1) to investigate the impact 
of socialistic internal capital markets on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. To control 
for possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, we compute the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm and year.  
Panel A in Table 4 presents the ordinary least square (OLS) regression results for 
Model (1) using the full sample. Management compensation is significantly sensitive 
to operating income in all regressions. Specifically, in the first regression when NOR 
and firm size are included, the estimation of coefficient on changes in operating 
income (ΔOI) is 0.189 at a significance level of 1%, indicating that managers’ 
compensation changes RMB 0.189 for every RMB 1,000 changes in firm’s operating 
income.22 We do not find that management compensation is significantly associated 
with firm stock returns. This is reasonable as parent companies were not allowed to 
                                                 
22 We recognize that the sensitivity may not be economically significant although it is statistically 
significant. 
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sell their shares on the stock market in China before 2006, therefore stock returns did 
not affect the wealth of parent companies directly, and they may not have the 
incentive to contract managerial compensation based on stock returns. Pan et al. 
(2006) and Li et al. (2013) also find that Chinese managers’ compensation is mainly 
contracted based on accounting performance, rather than stock performance.  
We are mainly interested in the impact of socialistic internal capital markets on 
the pay-performance sensitivity. We find that the reallocation of a large amount of 
cross-subsidization (NOR) has a significantly negative impact on the pay-performance 
sensitivity. Specifically, the estimated coefficient of NOR*ΔOI is -0.002, which is 
significantly negative at the 5% level (the t-value is -2.57). The negative impact of 
NOR on the pay-performance sensitivity is consistent with our first hypothesis that 
managerial compensation is less sensitive to firm performance with the presence of 
socialistic internal capital markets. NOR*RETURN is negative but insignificant, 
suggesting that cross-subsidization does not affect the association between CEO 
compensation and stock returns. We also find that the level of NOR is negatively 
associated with changes in manager’s compensation and there is no association 
between changes in firm’s assets and manager’s compensation. 
The second regression includes POLITIC. We find that politically connected 
CEOs have lower pay-performance sensitivity, and other results are almost the same 
as those in the first regression. The lower pay-performance sensitivity for politically 
connected CEOs may be due to different compensation structure and incentives such 
as the promotion of politically connected CEOs to government positions. As the net of 
accounts receivable and accounts payable due from and to parent companies (NAR) 
may also reflect cross-subsidization, we include NAR in the third regression. NAR is 
calculated as the net of accounts receivable (AR) and accounts payable (AP) due from 
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and to the parent company and its subsidiaries if AR>AP, and zero otherwise, deflated 
by sales (excluding related party sales).We find that NAR does not affect CEO 
compensations and pay-performance sensitivity, suggesting that NAR may not 
represent cross-subsidization.  
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
We further carry out the cross- and within-tests. For cross-test, we construct a 
dummy variable (NORDUM) which is equal to one for firms with positive internal 
capital transfer and zero otherwise. We then interact NORDUM with firm 
performance (NORDUM*ΔOI). Panel B in Table 4 reports the regression results of the 
cross-test. The cross-test indicates that there is a weak negative association between 
the existence of the internal capital market and pay-performance sensitivity (the 
coefficient on NORDUM*ΔOI is -0.114, p<10%). We also carry out the within-test by 
focusing on firms with positive internal capital transfer and test whether the 
magnitude of NOR has an impact. The within-test indicates that the magnitude of 
NOR also negatively affects pay-performance sensitivity for firms with positive 
internal capital transfer (the coefficient on NOR*ΔOI is -0.002, p<5%).  
Gibbons and Murphy (1990) find that changes in CEO pay are negatively and 
significantly affected by relative performance evaluation such as industry and market 
performance. Prior studies also show that the uncertainty in the firm’s operating 
environment may affect the degree to which the manager’s performance can be 
efficiently monitored and may relate to pay-performance sensitivity (Demsetz and 
Lehn 1985; Lippert and Moore 1994). Thus, we control for industry performance and 
firm risk in the pay-performance sensitivity regression. Industry performance is 
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measured as the industry median changes in operating income. Firm risk is measured 
as the standard deviation of ROA over the past three years. Panel C of Table 4 reports 
the OLS regression results. The number of observations reduces to 2,881 due to some 
missing values on firm risk measures. The main results on pay-performance 
sensitivity are qualitatively the same as those reported in Panel A. However, we find 
that industry performance (INDOI) is significantly and positively related to CEO pay, 
which is contradicted to Gibbons and Murphy (1990). It may suggest that Chinese 
listed firms do not use relative performance to evaluate their managers. The 
coefficient on the interaction between firm risk and accounting performance 
(RISK*ΔOI) is significantly negative, indicating that the uncertainty in firms’ 
operating environment negatively affects pay-performance sensitivity which is 
consistent with prior literature (e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999). 
Although pay-performance elasticity is more stable than pay-performance 
sensitivity, Murphy (1999) claims that “the primary advantage of the sensitivity 
approach is that sensitivities have a more natural economic interpretation. The pay-
performance sensitivity represents the executive’s “share” of value creation. Since 
agency costs arise when agents receive less than 100% of the value of output, the 
“sharing rate” seems a natural measure of the severity of the agency problem; 
elasticities have no corresponding agency-theoretic interpretation.” Since our paper 
centers on managerial agency problem, we report the main results based on pay-
performance sensitivity rather than elasticity. As a robustness test, we also employ 
pay-performance elasticity to test our first hypothesis. The dependent variable is 
changes in the natural log of CEO compensations and the performance measure is 
changes in return on assets. The untabulated reports suggest that the results based on 
pay-performance elasticity are similar to those based on pay-performance sensitivity.  
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In summary, Table 4 shows that the presence of socialistic internal capital 
markets negatively affects Chinese managers’ pay-performance sensitivity, which is 
consistent with our first hypothesis.23 
 
B. Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets 
We employ Model (2) to empirically examine the relation between managerial 
agency costs and socialistic internal capital markets. Table 5 presents the OLS 
regression results for Model (2). The reported results in all three regressions indicate a 
significantly positive association between managerial agency costs and the measure of 
socialistic internal capital markets (NOR). For example, when agency costs are 
measured by operating expenses (OEXP), the estimated coefficient of NOR is 0.242 
(t-statistic is 3.59 which is at 1% significance level). Economically, this indicates that 
operating expenses will increase by 0.242 dollars for every dollar of financial 
resources that is reallocated from a listed company to a parent company. These results 
are consistent with our second hypothesis.  
We also find some results in the three regressions which are consistent with 
existing literature. Consistent with Kalcheva and Lins (2007), we find that the level of 
cash holdings (CASH) is positively associated with all three agency costs measures. 
We also find managerial ownership (MOWN) and parent firm ownership (POWN) to 
be negatively related to agency costs in all three agency costs measures which is 
consistent with Ang et al. (2000). However, state ownership (STATE) is significantly 
negatively related to agency costs measured by assets utilization (AUR) and 
managerial perks (CENT) but not operating expenses (OEXP). It may be due to the 
                                                 
23 If managers, rather than group CEOs, are able to control both inter-firm transfers and managerial 
compensation, low pay-performance sensitivities reported in Table 4 may be chosen because of risk-
aversion of managers. However, most of our sample firms are controlled by their parent companies, 
indicating group CEOs have the control of inter-firm transfers and managerial compensation. 
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fact that managers in government firms may be offered other incentive schemes, such 
as promotion to a government officer position. This result is also consistent with the 
finding of Claessens et al. (2002) that the entrenchment effect of large shareholdings 
is more pronounced in family-controlled groups than in state-controlled groups. 
Politically connected CEOs (POLITIC) is only negatively related to agency costs 
measured by operating expenses (OEXP) but not the other two measures (AUR and 
CENT). The negative impact on agency costs may also due to other incentives offered 
by the government to politically connected managers.  
We also find that leverage is positively related to agency costs, which indicates 
that state-owned banks do not perform their monitoring function well in China. Tian 
and Estrin (2007) ascribe the failure of governance role by debt to the soft budget 
constraints in the relationship between state-owned companies and government-
controlled banks in China. Managerial compensation (lnCEOPAY) is significantly 
negatively associated with AUR, which suggests that higher levels of compensation 
can reduce agency costs.  
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
As we discussed in Section II, we hand collect the perquisite information from 
financial statement notes to examine the validity of CENT. Approximately 30% of the 
sample firms disclose the details of the selling, general and administrative (SGA) 
expenses and hence we only have 1,440 observations in the regression which uses 
PERK as a proxy of agency costs. The results reported in Table 6 (Regression 1) are 
generally consistent with those in Table 5. 
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We employ another two alternative proxies of agency costs. The first proxy is the 
asset liquidity ratio, which is defined as the sum of cash and marketable securities 
scaled by total assets (Prowse, 1990). Larger cash holdings are accompanied by 
greater management discretion in the employment of these funds which exacerbates 
the agency problems. As cross-subsidization reduces the cash holdings in listed 
companies mechanically, a more appropriate measure here is the cash holdings before 
cross-subsidization. We thus define the adjusted asset liquidity ratio as (Cash + 
Marketable Securities + OREC - OPAB)/Assets. The second proxy is the magnitude 
of free cash flows. Greater retention of free cash flows is envisaged as being 
indicative of potential agency problems (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989). As Chinese firms 
generally classify intra-group loans as cash flows from operations, we also employ the 
free cash flows before cross-subsidization, which is defined as (Cash flows from 
operations – Income taxes – Interests – Dividends + OREC - OPAB)/Assets. The 
results reported in Table 6 suggest that both the asset liquidity ratio (ALIQ) and the 
free cash flows (FCF) are positively and significantly related to our measure of cross-
subsidization, further corroborating our second hypothesis. 
 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
Our tests implicitly assume that the observations are independent of each other, 
but the variables may be highly correlated across time. To control for this problem, 
we compute standard errors clustered by firm and year. We also compute the firm-
level averages of all of the variables over the sample period, and test our model using 
the average values. The untabulated findings reveal that our results are robust to this 
problem.  
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C. Endogeneity 
As both NOR and the proxies for agency costs may be correlated with certain 
omitted firm characteristics, the absence of these variables may lead to a spurious 
relation between NOR and agency costs. To control for this potential endogeneity, we 
also carry out firm fixed-effects regressions and two-stage least-squares (2SLS) 
regressions. In the 2SLS regressions, we use lagged NOR as the instrument variable 
for NOR. Unreported analyses show that the lagged NOR is highly correlated with 
NOR but uncorrelated with the second-stage error terms, thus ensuring the validity of 
our instrument. The untabulated results for both the firm fixed-effects and 2SLS 
regressions are quantitatively the same as those in OLS regressions in Table 5. 
The validity of 2SLS regressions largely depends on the choice of instrumental 
variables in the first stage. The lagged values used in this paper may be not good 
instrument variables because these variables can be very sticky. Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that when appropriate exogenous 
variables are not available and when the endogenous variable is highly serial 
correlated, we can employ GMM method to address potential endogeneity issues 
which uses the lagged values of dependant variables as instruments. The system 
GMM regression results are reported in Table 7. The association between socialistic 
internal capital markets (NOR) and managerial agency costs is still positive and 
significant, indicating that our results in Table 5 are robust to potential endogeneity 
issues.  
 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
 
 29 
D. The Validity of the Measure of Socialistic Cross-Subsidization 
This study provides a direct measure of socialistic cross-subsidization from 
strong to weak member firms. We also investigate the validity of our measure by 
comparing it to the other measures in the existing literature. Prior literature primarily 
uses the following measures to assess the capital reallocation efficiency for segment j 
(Datta et al., 2009; McNeil and Moore, 2005; Rajan et al., 2000) : 
1 ( )( )
S S
j j
j S S
j j
I I
A E q q
B A B A
   ; 
1
2 ( ) ( ( ) )
S S S Sn
j j j j
j jS S S S
jj j j j
I I I I
A E q q
B A B A B A B A
Z
 
    ¦ ; 
3 ( 1)( )
S S
j j
j S S
j j
I I
A E q
B A B A
   ; 
where qj is the Tobin’s q for segment j; q  is the asset-weighted average q of the 
business group’s segments; Ij is capital expenditures for segment j; BAj is the book 
value of assets for segment j at the beginning of the year; 
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average ratio of capital expenditures to beginning assets for stand-alone firms 
operating in the same industry as segment j. jZ is the proportion of segment j’s book 
value of assets to business group’s assets.  
As the parent companies are non-listed companies, we cannot obtain the 
investment and market value data of the parent companies and thus could not 
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cross-subsidization. Similar to Rajan et al. (2000), we define socialistic cross-
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where j represents the listed firms. Pearson correlation analyses indicate that SCS1 is 
significantly and positively correlated with our measure of socialistic cross-
subsidization, NOR (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.0747, p<0.001), which 
supports the validity of our measure.  
We also hand collect the accounting performance for 195 parent companies 
from the prospectuses provided by listed companies when they went public. We 
define an alternative proxy for socialistic cross-subsidization (SCS2) as one if the 
listed firms are more profitable than their parent units in ROE (or in ROA when ROE 
data is missing) and 0
S S
j j
S S
j j
I I
B A B A
  , where j represents the listed firms. Again we 
find that SCS2 is positively and significantly associated with NOR (Pearson 
correlation coefficient = 0.0782, p<0.10). This corroborates the validity of our 
measure.  
 
E. The Impact of the Split-Share Structure Reform in 2005 
Before 2005, Chinese listed companies had split-share ownership structure: 
shares owned by most controlling shareholders (typically the government or legal 
persons) are not allowed to be traded in the stock market and shares owned by 
minority shareholders are typically tradable. One of the main problems of the split-
share structure is that controlling shareholders do not care about the movement of 
stock prices because their shares are not tradable on the market (Firth et al., 2010). 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued a guideline in April 
2005 to reform the split-share structure by converting the non-floating shares into 
floating. The reform guideline allows non-floating and floating shareholders to decide 
between themselves the acceptable compensation that the former group has to pay to 
 31 
the latter to convert non-floating shares into floating. The reform represented an 
exogenous shock to firms’ governance systems that increased incentives for large 
shareholders to be concerned about share prices. To control for possible changes of 
managers’ incentives, we include a dummy variable which equals to one for years 
after 2005 and zero otherwise in the main regression models. Untabulated regression 
results show that the reform has a positive impact on the managerial pay-performance 
sensitivity and a negative impact on one of the operating expenses measures (OEXP). 
However, our main findings are robust to the inclusion of the split-share reform 
dummy. 
 
F. The Moderation Role of Corporate Governance 
Well-functioning corporate governance systems are expected to mitigate the 
managerial agency problems and hence impact the association between socialistic 
internal capital transfer and managerial agency costs. We employ three measures to 
capture internal corporate governance systems: the percentage of independent 
directors sitting on the board (INDIRECT), hiring an international Big-4 auditor 
(AUDIT), and managerial ownership (MOWN). We anticipate that board 
independence, audit quality, and managerial ownership can alleviate the positive 
association between internal capital transfer and managerial costs by enhancing 
monitoring of management or better aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders. As institutional investors typically have incentives to monitor 
management, we use institutional investors’ ownership (IOWN) as a proxy for 
external governance. Bai et al. (2004) suggest that the percentage of shareholding by 
minority shareholders (SOWN) is positively associated with firm value. We thus also 
use minority shareholdings as another measure of external governance. Table 8 
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suggests that the association between managerial agency costs and internal capital 
transfer is weaker for firms with more independent boards, better audit quality, and 
higher managerial ownership. This implies that strong internal corporate governance 
alleviates the impact of internal capital transfer on managerial agency costs. However, 
the association between managerial agency costs and internal capital transfer is not 
weaker for firms with higher institutional ownership and minority shareholder 
ownership. This may suggest that minority shareholders and institutional investors 
exert very limited influences over management in China. 
 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
This study provides empirical evidence of managerial agency costs in socialistic 
internal capital markets. The socialistic subsidization of weak member firms by strong 
member firms reduces the managerial incentive in strong member firms, because 
managers are obliged to share the surplus that is generated by their own firm with 
other member firms. This cross-subsidization also increases the noise in performance 
measures and negatively affects the pay-performance sensitivity in strong member 
firms, which induces lower-powered incentives and exacerbates the agency problem 
in strong member firms. 
Using a unique dataset from China, we show that the pay-performance sensitivity 
of Chinese managers is negatively associated with the amount of resources that are 
reallocated, indicating that incentive schemes are less powerful in the presence of a 
socialistic internal capital market. We further document a positive relation between 
socialistic cross-subsidization and managerial agency costs in strong member firms. 
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Our study is the first to directly empirically test the impact of cross-subsidization 
on agency costs in strong member firms within a business group. The Chinese setting 
of the study is distinct because listed companies in China are required to disclose their 
other receivables from their parent company in the notes to their financial statements. 
Our study complements existing studies, which can only indirectly measure socialistic 
internal capital markets, and provides an alternative explanation for the diversification 
discount that is related to internal capital markets, namely, that the discount may 
partly result from the agency conflicts between group headquarters and the managers 
of strong member firms. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection and Composition 
 
The table reports the sample selection process and sample composition by year and 
industry. The industry classification is based on the classification by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission. 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection Process 
 Firm-year observations 
All firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges during 2004-2008 
 
8,491 
Firms listed less than one year (654) 
Firms without required financial, stock return, 
and governance information 
 
(2,050) 
Firms without CEO compensation data (1,234) 
Firms without internal capital transfer data (360) 
Final sample 4,193 
 
Panel B: Sample Composition by Year 
Year Observations Percentage 
2004 20 0.48% 
2005 1017 24.25% 
2006 1028 24.52% 
2007 1022 24.37% 
2008 1106 26.38% 
Total 4193 100.00% 
Note: Because managerial compensation data is missing for most firms in 2004, the 
number of observations for year 2004 is small. Removing year 2004 observations 
from our sample does not change the main results. 
 
Panel C: Sample Composition by Industry 
Industry Observations Percentage 
Agriculture 96 2.29% 
Mining 75 1.79% 
Food 176 4.20% 
Textiles 183 4.36% 
Furniture 14 0.33% 
Paper 81 1.93% 
Petrochemicals 469 11.19% 
Electronics 159 3.79% 
Minerals 389 9.28% 
Machinery 682 16.27% 
Pharmaceuticals 295 7.04% 
Other 
manufacturing 48 1.14% 
Utilities 171 4.08% 
Construction 91 2.17% 
Transportation 147 3.51% 
 40 
Information 
technology 271 6.46% 
Retail 250 5.96% 
Finance 2 0.05% 
Real estate 200 4.77% 
Services 137 3.27% 
Communications 37 0.88% 
Conglomerates 220 5.25% 
Total 4193 100.00% 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample Firms 
 
NOR is the net of other receivables (OREC) and other payables (OPAB) due from and 
to the parent company and its subsidiaries if OREC>OPAB, and zero otherwise, 
deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). OEXP is the operating expenses 
minus the compensation of the top executives and bad debt expense, deflated by sales 
(excluding related party sales). AUR is the asset utilization ratio, which is computed 
as sales divided by average total assets (excluding other receivables) multiplied by (-
1). CENT is the cash payment that is made for other operating activities (mainly 
traveling and entertainment activities), deflated by sales (excluding related party 
sales). POWN is the percentage of shares that are held by the parent company, and 
MOWN is the percentage of shares that are held by managers. STATE is a dummy that 
equals one if the firm is controlled by the state or a state-owned firm, and zero 
otherwise. INDIRECT is the proportion of independent directors on board. AUDIT is a 
dummy that equals one if the firm has a Big-4 auditor, and zero otherwise. POLITIC 
is a dummy that equals one if CEO serves as former or current government bureaucrat 
and zero otherwise. CEOPAY is the cash salaries and bonuses that are paid to the 
CEO. ROA is the operating income divided by the total assets at the beginning of the 
period. RETURN is the firm’s annual stock return minus market return in the same 
period. TA is the book value of total assets at the end of the year. LEV is the leverage 
ratio, which is computed as long-term liabilities divided by year-end total assets. All 
of the continuous variables are winsorized at 1% at each tail. 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
NOR (%) 2.119 0.000 14.414 
OEXP (%) 16.985 11.762 19.907 
AUR (%) -71.745 -59.528 50.635 
CENT (%) 18.764 8.730 38.810 
POWN (%) 37.002 34.950 15.314 
MOWN (%) 0.043 0.000 0.223 
STATE 0.694 1 0.461 
INDIRECT (%) 35.359 33.333 4.719 
AUDIT 0.049 0 0.217 
POLITIC 0.091 0 0.288 
CEOPAY (in thousands RMB) 320.140 230.800 371.691 
ROA (%) 1.976 2.756 8.663 
RETURN (%) 6.580 -3.438 70.855 
TA (in millions RMB) 4,813.6 1,791.2 27,083.7 
LEV (%) 5.670 1.647 8.412 
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix of the Variables 
 
This table reports the Pearson correlations for our main regression variables. NOR is the net of other receivables (OREC) and other payables 
(OPAB) due from and to the parent company and its subsidiaries if OREC>OPAB, and zero otherwise, deflated by sales (excluding related party 
sales). OEXP is the operating expenses minus the compensation of the top executives and bad debt expense, deflated by sales (excluding related 
party sales). AUR is the asset utilization ratio, which is computed as sales divided by average total assets (excluding other receivables) multiplied 
by (-1). CENT is the cash payment that is made for other operating activities (mainly traveling and entertainment activities), deflated by sales 
(excluding related party sales). POWN is the percentage of shares that are held by the parent company, and MOWN is the percentage of shares 
that are held by managers. STATE is a dummy that equals one if the firm is controlled by the state or a state-owned firm, and zero otherwise. 
INDIRECT is the proportion of independent directors on board. AUDIT is a dummy that equals one if the firm has a Big-4 auditor, and zero 
otherwise. POLITIC is a dummy that equals one if CEO serves as former or current government bureaucrats and zero otherwise. CEOPAY is the 
cash salaries and bonuses that are paid to the CEO. ROA is the operating income divided by the total assets at the beginning of the period. 
RETURN is the firm’s annual stock return minus the market return. TA is the book value of total assets at the end of the year. LEV is the leverage 
ratio, which is computed as long-term liabilities divided by total assets. The coefficients in bold are significant at the 1% level (two-tailed). 
 
 NOR OEXP AUR CENT POWN MOWN STATE INDIRECT AUDIT POLITIC CEOPAY ROA RETURN TA LEV 
NOR 1.000               
OEXP 0.227 1.000              
AUR 0.112 0.292 1.000             
CENT 0.143 0.533 0.255 1.000            
POWN 0.005 -0.122 -0.098 -0.098 1.000           
MOWN -0.025 -0.011 -0.048 -0.032 -0.044 1.000          
STATE -0.010 -0.096 -0.107 -0.116 0.243 -0.187 1.000         
INDIRECT -0.028 0.013 0.028 0.011 -0.024 0.017 -0.058 1.000        
AUDIT -0.027 -0.041 -0.035 -0.051 0.065 -0.009 0.061 0.029 1.000       
POLITIC -0.010 -0.021 0.060 0.021 0.001 0.020 -0.012 -0.011 -0.019 1.000      
CEOPAY -0.153 -0.156 -0.212 -0.134 -0.020 0.066 0.028 0.046 0.196 -0.011 1.000     
ROA -0.294 -0.404 -0.186 -0.248 0.127 0.069 0.034 -0.033 0.062 0.016 0.301 1.000    
RETURN -0.052 -0.059 -0.048 -0.038 0.025 -0.043 0.003 0.014 -0.005 -0.002 0.095 0.189 1.000   
TA -0.168 -0.330 -0.154 -0.218 0.233 -0.070 0.252 0.016 0.328 0.017 0.404 0.259 0.103 1.000  
LEV -0.052 -0.087 0.221 -0.022 0.033 -0.052 0.083 0.013 0.081 0.032 0.064 -0.010 0.046 0.325 1.000 
Table 4 
Socialistic Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Compensation 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results for Model (1). The dependent variable is 
changes in managerial compensation (ΔCEOPAY) which is calculated as the cash 
salaries and bonuses that are paid to CEO. ΔOI is changes in operating income (in 
thousands RMB). RETURN is the firm’s annual stock return minus the market return. 
NOR is the net of other receivables (OREC) and other payables (OPAB) due from and 
to the parent company and its subsidiaries if OREC>OPAB, and zero otherwise, 
deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). POLITIC is a dummy that equals one 
if CEO serves as former or current government bureaucrat and zero otherwise. NAR is 
the net of accounts receivable (AR) and accounts payable (AP) due from and to the 
parent company and its subsidiaries if AR>AP, and zero otherwise, deflated by sales 
(excluding related party sales). ΔTA is changes in the book value of total assets at the 
end of the year (in millions RMB). The t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm and year. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Panel A: Full sample regressions 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
 Dependent Variable = 
ΔCEOPAY 
Dependent Variable = 
ΔCEOPAY 
Dependent Variable = 
ΔCEOPAY 
    
ΔOI 0.189*** 0.222*** 0.223*** 
 (3.130) (2.959) (2.933) 
RETURN 80.703 70.324 75.830 
 (0.782) (0.641) (0.666) 
NOR -277.121** -264.692* -268.063* 
 (-1.969) (-1.653) (-1.850) 
NOR*ΔOI -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-2.567) (-2.626) (-2.662) 
NOR*RETURN -2.141 -2.116 -2.126 
 (-0.853) (-0.860) (-0.830) 
POLITIC  -11,186.992 -11,394.585 
  (-1.398) (-1.418) 
POLITIC*ΔOI  -0.258*** -0.259*** 
  (-3.052) (-3.012) 
POLITIC*RETURN  8.498 7.007 
  (0.077) (0.063) 
NAR   -99.215 
   (-0.289) 
NAR*ΔOI   -0.001 
   (-1.063) 
NAR*RETURN   -3.633 
   (-1.521) 
ΔTA -2.075 -1.618 -1.679 
 (-0.220) (-0.178) (-0.186) 
Constant 14,822.519 15,346.891 15,294.058 
 (1.404) (1.220) (1.034) 
Year and industry 
dummies Included Included Included 
Observations# 3002 3002 3002 
Adjusted R-squared 0.033 0.038 0.037 
# As some observations lack CEO compensation information for year t-1, the sample size in this table is 
less than 4,193. 
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Panel B: Cross-test and within-test regressions 
 
 Regression 1: Cross-test 
Regression 2:  
Within-test 
(The subsample of firms with 
positive NOR) 
 Dependent Variable = 
ΔCEOPAY 
Dependent Variable = 
ΔCEOPAY 
   
ΔOI 0.236*** 0.242** 
 (3.284) (2.302) 
NORDUM -8,602.902*  
 (-1.901)  
NORDUM*ΔOI -0.114*  
 (-1.754)  
NOR  -264.431 
  (-0.888) 
NOR*ΔOI  -0.002** 
  (-2.234) 
POLITIC -10,652.232 11,998.031 
 (-1.165) (0.383) 
POLITIC*ΔOI -0.254*** -0.335 
 (-3.437) (-0.744) 
ΔTA -1.478 -15.810*** 
 (-0.162) (-3.387) 
Constant 9,192.125*** 36,253.767*** 
 (4.974) (5.660) 
Year and industry dummies Included Included 
Observations 3003 324 
Adjusted R-squared 0.039 0.077 
Note: NORDUM is a dummy variable equal to one when NOR>0 and zero otherwise. 
 
Panel C: Control for industry performance and firm risk 
 
 Dependent Variable = ΔCEOPAY 
  
ΔOI 0.244*** 
 (2.872) 
NOR -99.370 
 (-0.515) 
NOR*ΔOI -0.001*** 
 (-3.498) 
POLITIC -9,316.607 
 (-0.730) 
POLITIC*ΔOI -0.131** 
 (-2.164) 
INDOI 2.775** 
 (2.163) 
RISK*ΔOI -0.395* 
 (-1.656) 
ΔTA 1.508 
 (0.234) 
Constant 71151.67 
 (1.26) 
Year and industry dummies Included  
Observations 2881 
Adjusted R-squared 0.040 
Note: INDOI is the industry median changes in operating income (in thousands RMB). RISK is the 
standard deviation of ROA over the past three years. 
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Table 5 
Socialistic Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Agency Costs:  
OLS Regressions 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results for Model (2). The dependent variables are the three 
measures of managerial agency costs. OEXP is the operating expenses minus the compensation of the 
top executives and bad debt expense, deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). AUR is the asset 
utilization ratio, which is computed as sales divided by average total assets (excluding other receivables) 
multiplied by (-1). CENT is the cash payment that is made for other operating activities (mainly 
traveling and entertainment activities), deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). PERK is the 
sum of entertainment, traveling, overseas training and traveling, and corporate limousine expenses 
disclosed in annual reports, deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). NOR is the net of other 
receivables (OREC) and other payables (OPAB) due from and to the parent company and its 
subsidiaries if OREC>OPAB, and zero otherwise, deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). 
There are 324 observations with non-zero NOR. POWN is the percentage of shares that are held by the 
parent company, and MOWN is the percentage of shares that are held by managers. STATE is a dummy 
that equals one if the firm is controlled by the state or a state-owned firm, and zero otherwise. 
INDIRECT is the proportion of independent directors on board. AUDIT is a dummy that equals one if 
the firm has a Big-4 auditor, and zero otherwise. POLITIC is a dummy that equals one if CEO serves as 
former or current government bureaucrats and zero otherwise. CEOPAY is the cash salaries and 
bonuses that are paid to CEO. CASH is the beginning-of-period cash holdings, deflated by sales 
(excluding related party sales). TA is the book value of total assets (excluding other receivables) at the 
end of the year. LEV is the leverage ratio, which is computed as long-term liabilities divided by total 
assets. The t-values in parentheses are computed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered by firm and year. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
 Dependent Variable = OEXP 
Dependent Variable 
= AUR 
Dependent Variable 
= CENT 
    
NOR 0.242*** 0.273*** 0.259** 
 (3.585) (6.990) (2.081) 
POWN -0.070*** -0.258*** -0.104*** 
 (-3.516) (-4.515) (-3.321) 
MOWN -2.702*** -14.585*** -7.930*** 
 (-4.674) (-6.317) (-9.144) 
STATE -0.693 -8.337*** -5.461*** 
 (-0.972) (-3.641) (-3.674) 
INDIRECT 0.102 0.209 0.133 
 (1.543) (1.466) (0.695) 
AUDIT 6.322*** 7.185* 3.266* 
 (4.138) (1.713) (1.732) 
POLITIC -1.760** 4.961 1.488 
 (-2.353) (1.364) (0.592) 
Ln(CEOPAY) -0.475 -10.245*** -1.965 
 (-0.526) (-7.108) (-1.423) 
CASH 5.847*** 37.740*** 10.046*** 
 (4.513) (10.860) (5.438) 
Ln(TA) -5.284*** -5.910*** -5.596*** 
 (-11.548) (-5.479) (-7.075) 
LEV 0.048 1.538*** 0.164*** 
 (1.348) (14.065) (3.051) 
Constant 128.996*** 132.695*** 159.477*** 
 (9.810) (5.623) (5.267) 
Year and industry 
dummies Included Included Included 
Observations 4193 4193 4193 
Adjusted R-squared 0.166 0.297 0.109 
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Table 6 
Socialistic Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Agency Costs:  
Alternative Measures of Agency Costs 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results for Model (2) using three alternative measures of agency 
costs. PERK is the sum of entertainment, traveling, overseas training and traveling, and corporate 
limousine expenses disclosed in annual reports, deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). ALIQ 
is the asset liquidity ratio which is defined as (Cash + Marketable Securities + OREC - OPAB)/Assets. 
FCF is the measure of free cash flows which is calculated as (Cash flow from operations – Income 
taxes – Interests – Dividends + OREC - OPAB)/Assets. NOR is the net of other receivables (OREC) 
and other payables (OPAB) due from and to the parent company and its subsidiaries if OREC>OPAB, 
and zero otherwise, deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). There are 324 observations with 
non-zero NOR. POWN is the percentage of shares that are held by the parent company, and MOWN is 
the percentage of shares that are held by managers. STATE is a dummy that equals one if the firm is 
controlled by the state or a state-owned firm, and zero otherwise. INDIRECT is the proportion of 
independent directors on board. AUDIT is a dummy that equals one if the firm has a Big-4 auditor, and 
zero otherwise. POLITIC is a dummy that equals one if CEO serves as former or current government 
bureaucrats and zero otherwise. CEOPAY is the cash salaries and bonuses that are paid to CEO. CASH 
is the beginning-of-period cash holdings, deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). TA is the 
book value of total assets (excluding other receivables) at the end of the year. LEV is the leverage ratio, 
which is computed as long-term liabilities divided by total assets. The t-values in parentheses are 
computed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm and year. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
 Dependent Variable = PERK 
Dependent 
Variable = ALIQ 
Dependent 
Variable = FCF 
    
NOR 0.017*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (2.764) (6.344) (6.460) 
POWN -0.004 0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.009) (0.143) (-0.932) 
MOWN -0.243* 0.031*** 0.012** 
 (-1.819) (3.508) (2.218) 
STATE -0.521*** 0.008 0.007*** 
 (-4.700) (1.498) (3.210) 
INDIRECT -0.005 -0.001*** -0.000 
 (-0.906) (-2.606) (-0.221) 
AUDIT 0.185 -0.017** 0.007 
 (0.697) (-2.276) (1.042) 
POLITIC -0.232*** -0.012 0.002 
 (-2.642) (-1.320) (0.288) 
Ln(CEOPAY) 0.160** 0.023*** 0.006** 
 (2.005) (7.046) (2.026) 
CASH 0.556*** 0.105*** -0.015** 
 (4.943) (12.169) (-2.281) 
Ln(TA) -0.511*** 0.001 0.005*** 
 (-10.010) (0.350) (3.989) 
LEV 0.006 -0.003*** -0.000** 
 (0.808) (-14.855) (-2.270) 
Constant 10.482*** -0.168** -0.154*** 
 (7.206) (-2.279) (-4.552) 
Year and industry 
dummies Included Included Included 
Observations 1440 3980 4037 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.200 0.245 0.098 
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Table 7 
Socialistic Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Agency Costs:  
System GMM regressions  
 
This table reports the system GMM regression results for Model (2). The dependent variables are the 
four measures of managerial agency costs. OEXP is the operating expenses minus the compensation of 
the top executives and bad debt expense, deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). AUR is the 
asset utilization ratio, which is computed as sales divided by average total assets (excluding other 
receivables) multiplied by (-1). CENT is the cash payment that is made for other operating activities 
(mainly traveling and entertainment activities), deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). PERK 
is the sum of entertainment, traveling, overseas training and traveling, and corporate limousine 
expenses disclosed in annual reports, deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). NOR is the net of 
other receivables (OREC) and other payables (OPAB) due from and to the parent company and its 
subsidiaries if OREC>OPAB, and zero otherwise, deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). 
There are 324 observations with non-zero NOR. POWN is the percentage of shares that are held by the 
parent company, and MOWN is the percentage of shares that are held by managers. STATE is a dummy 
that equals one if the firm is controlled by the state or a state-owned firm, and zero otherwise. 
INDIRECT is the proportion of independent directors on board. AUDIT is a dummy that equals one if 
the firm has a Big-4 auditor, and zero otherwise. POLITIC is a dummy that equals one if CEO serves as 
former or current government bureaucrats and zero otherwise. CEOPAY is the cash salaries and 
bonuses that are paid to CEO. CASH is the beginning-of-period cash holdings, deflated by sales 
(excluding related party sales). TA is the book value of total assets (excluding other receivables) at the 
end of the year. LEV is the leverage ratio, which is computed as long-term liabilities divided by total 
assets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
 Dependent Variable = OEXP 
Dependent Variable 
= AUR 
Dependent Variable 
= CENT 
Dependent Variable 
= PERK 
     
NOR 0.127*** 0.090* 0.148** 0.022*** 
 (3.415) (1.807) (2.073) (4.763) 
POWN -0.059*** -0.051*** -0.070** -0.001 
 (-4.329) (-2.701) (-2.422) (-0.745) 
MOWN -0.783 -2.000 -2.812 0.111 
 (-0.822) (-1.500) (-1.360) (0.847) 
STATE 0.617 -3.095*** -1.843* -0.362*** 
 (1.337) (-4.785) (-1.854) (-7.266) 
INDIRECT 0.036 -0.003 -0.141 0.005 
 (0.816) (-0.052) (-1.481) (1.070) 
AUDIT 4.867*** -2.166 3.879* 0.101 
 (4.943) (-1.620) (1.878) (0.850) 
POLITIC -1.027 -0.298 -1.246 -0.234*** 
 (-1.394) (-0.300) (-0.810) (-2.995) 
Ln(CEOPAY) -0.080 -2.458*** -2.200*** 0.161*** 
 (-0.287) (-6.054) (-3.725) (5.596) 
CASH 0.095 -5.143*** -1.531 0.296*** 
 (0.157) (-5.113) (-1.178) (4.401) 
Ln(TA) -3.351*** 1.578*** -3.925*** -0.405*** 
 (-13.281) (4.495) (-7.635) (-13.410) 
LEV 0.059** 0.298*** 0.092* 0.009*** 
  (7.226) (1.655) (3.345) 
Lagged values of 
dependent variables 0.443*** 0.852*** 0.361*** 0.226*** 
 (24.577) (50.231) (19.272) (6.135) 
Constant 82.978*** -15.050* 130.950*** 7.022*** 
 (14.404) (-1.947) (11.370) (10.419) 
Year and industry 
dummies Included Included Included Included 
Observations 4006 4192 4191 1257 
Wald Chi-squared 2115.43 10956.40 1130.31 1858.84 
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Table 8 
Socialistic Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Agency Costs: 
The Moderating Role of Corporate Governance 
 
The dependent variables in regressions 1 through 3 are the three measures of managerial agency 
costs. OEXP is the operating expenses minus the compensation of the top executives and bad debt 
expense, deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). AUR is the asset utilization ratio, which 
is computed as sales divided by average total assets (excluding other receivables) multiplied by (-
1). CENT is the cash payment that is made for other operating activities (mainly traveling and 
entertainment activities), deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). NOR is the net of other 
receivables (OREC) and other payables (OPAB) due from and to the parent company and its 
subsidiaries if OREC>OPAB, and zero otherwise, deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). 
AUDIT is a dummy that equals one if the firm has a Big-4 auditor, and zero otherwise. POWN is 
the percentage of shares that are held by the parent company, and MOWN is the percentage of 
shares that are held by managers. IOWN is the percentage of shares that are held by institutional 
investors. SOWN is the percentage of shares that are held by the second to the fifth largest 
shareholders. STATE is a dummy that equals one if the firm is controlled by the state or a state-
owned firm, and zero otherwise. INDIRECT is the proportion of independent directors on board. 
POLITIC is a dummy that equals one if CEO serves as former or current government bureaucrats 
and zero otherwise. CEOPAY is the cash salaries and bonuses that are paid to CEO. CASH is the 
beginning-of-period cash holdings, deflated by sales (excluding related party sales). TA is the 
book value of total assets (excluding other receivables) at the end of the year. LEV is the leverage 
ratio, which is computed as long-term liabilities divided by total assets. The t-values in 
parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm and year. *, 
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
 Dependent Variable = 
OEXP 
Dependent Variable = 
AUR 
Dependent Variable = 
CENT 
    
NOR 2.106*** 1.818*** 1.137 
 (3.019) (3.382) (1.204) 
NOR*INDIRECT -0.052*** -0.042*** -0.019 
 (-2.665) (-2.593) (-0.737) 
NOR*MOWN -4.781 4.428 -10.247* 
 (-1.155) (0.603) (-1.937) 
NOR*AUDIT -0.483*** 0.143 -0.537*** 
 (-5.407) (1.069) (-3.084) 
NOR*IOWN -0.013 0.048*** -0.025 
 (-1.068) (3.823) (-1.309) 
NOR*SOWN 0.000 -0.004 -0.009 
 (0.089) (-1.101) (-0.901) 
IOWN 0.123*** -0.370** -0.089* 
 (3.239) (-2.105) (-1.720) 
SOWN 0.077 -0.273** 0.095 
 (1.645) (-2.367) (1.109) 
POWN -0.009 -0.358*** -0.046 
 (-0.302) (-3.863) (-0.922) 
MOWN -1.886* -10.972*** -5.988*** 
 (-1.852) (-2.667) (-4.534) 
STATE -1.005 -6.408** -4.762*** 
 (-1.101) (-2.453) (-3.193) 
INDIRECT 0.234*** 0.269 0.286*** 
 (2.752) (1.271) (2.659) 
AUDIT 4.965*** 7.640 -0.310 
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 (2.798) (1.447) (-0.184) 
POLITIC -0.641 6.013* 2.650 
 (-0.565) (1.647) (0.983) 
Ln(CEOPAY) -0.277 -7.662*** -0.148 
 (-0.485) (-5.109) (-0.166) 
CASH 3.658*** 40.994*** 7.564*** 
 (3.441) (11.574) (2.600) 
Ln(TA) -3.951*** -5.387*** -2.910*** 
 (-7.928) (-3.681) (-3.803) 
LEV -0.061 1.615*** 0.044 
 (-1.536) (13.041) (0.530) 
Constant 93.368*** 88.697** 69.276*** 
 (7.515) (2.446) (3.914) 
Industry and year 
dummies 
Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Observations 3,094 3,094 3,094 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.181 0.336 0.108 
 
 
